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Abstract 
Although contemporary metaphysics has recently undergone a neo-Aristotelian revival wherein dispositions, or 
capacities are now commonplace in empirically grounded ontologies, being routinely utilised in theories of 
causality and modality, a central Aristotelian concept has yet to be given serious attention – the doctrine of 
hylomorphism. The reason for this is clear: while the Aristotelian ontological distinction between actuality and 
potentiality has proven to be a fruitful conceptual framework with which to model the operation of the natural 
world, the distinction between form and matter has yet to similarly earn its keep. In this chapter, I offer a first step 
toward showing that the hylomorphic framework is up to that task. To do so, I return to the birthplace of that 
doctrine - the biological realm. Utilising recent advances in developmental biology, I argue that the hylomorphic 
framework is an empirically adequate and conceptually rich explanatory schema with which to model the nature 
of organisms.  
 
There‟s no denying that contemporary metaphysics is experiencing an Aristotelian revival of sorts wherein 
dispositions, or „causal powers‟ are no longer regarded as scholastic superfluities, ideally to be explained 
away, but are instead being put to work in everything from theories of colour to theories of modality. But 
while the Aristotelian doctrine of „potentiality‟ is now widely understood as being fairly innocuous and 
even theoretically advantageous, there has been a recent notable rise in the defenders of a much more 
contentious Peripatetic postulate – the doctrine of hylomorphism. According to the ontological principle of 
hylomorphism, the natures of entities are in some sense metaphysically, or conceptually bipartite: they have 
both a material and a formal aspect. Thus, fully “grasping the nature” of an entity requires understanding it 
as the conceptual union of both aspects. 
 The minor surge of the defence of this doctrine notwithstanding, it‟s certainly safe to say that 
hylomorphism isn‟t currently en vogue, even amongst the most ardent defenders of a neo-Aristotelian 
metaphysic. To my mind, there‟s a simple reason for this: while the contemporary defenders of this 
doctrine have done quite a lot of work in precisely explicating what the conceptual notion of „form‟ 
amounts to, comparatively little has been done toward showing that this is a concept with empirical 
content. If we believe, as I do, that an effectual impetus to join a particular philosophical church must 
consist in more than simply being given a conceptual dissection of its characteristic complex metaphysical 
doctrine, the paucity of practitioners in the hylomorphic pews should come as little surprise.   
 With this in mind, this paper is a kind of altar call – its aim is to show that the hylomorphist‟s 
claim that fully grasping the nature of entities is a “two concept job” can be given firm empirical footing. 
To do so, I bring the conceptual focus back to its Aristotelian origin – the biological realm. My claim is 
that recent advances in developmental systems biology afford us an empirically tractable picture of the 
hylomorphic nature of biological entities by way of elucidating what the formal aspect of that nature 
consists in. The hope is that, having been enriched by an empirically informed conception of form, 
hylomorphism might once again be seen as good news for metaphysics. 
 
Hylomorphism: A Matter of Definition 
Taken generally, hylomorphism is the doctrine that fully capturing the metaphysical „nature‟ of an entity 
requires an appeal to two distinct (though ultimately intimately interrelated) concepts – matter, and form. 
Or, to put it another way, according to hylomorphism, any adequate metaphysical definition of an entity 
must be two-fold – it must encompass the nature of the entity qua matter and qua form. But what does 
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this bipartite distinction amount to? Let us say that to define the nature of an entity qua matter is to define 
it as an organised, connected collection of discrete parts; here, „organisation‟ and „connectivity‟ are to be 
understood, at the very least, both spatially and causally (and perhaps temporally), and „discrete‟ denotes 
their being ontologically, or existentially independent from one another. To define the nature of an entity 
qua form, on the other hand, is to define it as a holistic, dynamically directed structure; more on this 
momentarily. 
The claim of hylomorphism is that both of these concepts must be put to use in successfully 
“capturing the nature” of an entity – but what is involved in this task? Clearly, “capturing the nature” of 
an entity is to be understood as getting a grip on what that entity is in some metaphysically fundamental 
sense. In line with the now-popular Lockean understanding advocated in contemporary metaphysics, let 
us say that “capturing the nature” of an entity amounts to understanding why and how that entity possesses 
its characteristic set of properties: getting a grip on the nature of a clump of Gold, for instance, plausibly 
involves understanding why it has such-and-such surface-level properties (reflective surfaces, malleability, 
conductivity, etc.), which involves understanding how it comes to have them (through its molecular 
structure, or electron count, or etc.) – thus Kripke‟s (1980) appeal to its “periodic” nature.1 On this line of 
thinking, citing the nature of an entity affords one rich explanatory power with respect to its possession of 
a set of typical features – why those features are there (or why they could be there), and how they got there 
(or how they would have gotten there), etc.2 
Defining the nature of an entity qua matter then is to cite an entity‟s organised, connected 
collection of discrete parts as explanatory with respect to its possession of a characteristic set of features.3 
I take it that this sort of definitional methodology won‟t be unfamiliar to the reader – it is, after all, 
representative of the prominent philosophical project of reductionism – and so it‟s probably unnecessary 
to spend too much time on it here. What‟s more important for present purposes is to flesh-out precisely 
what it means to define the nature of an entity qua form. My approach here will be to trace the Peripatetic 
thread as it has weaved through contemporary hylomorphic accounts by distilling a set of shared criteria 
for a formal definition present in the literature.4 Though I‟ve already briefly mentioned a putative 
description of such a definition, it‟s instructive to consider it in more detail. To do so, I‟ll distinguish three 
aspects of a „formal definition‟; though, as we will see, these three are in some way intertwined.   
Firstly, to define the nature of an entity qua form is to offer an explanatory basis for its 
characteristic features in something “over and above” its mereological constituents. Formal definitions 
are often understood as demarcating higher-order facts about an entity‟s constituents – typically they either 
pick-out some privileged relation of those constituents (Fine 1999; Johnston 2006), or else some sort of 
process of (Koons 2014), or metaphysical operation on (Marmadoro 2013) those constituents. Importantly, in 
virtue of referring to something appropriately higher-order, formal definitions are taken not to refer to 
any extra mereological part of those entities (Johnston 2006; Rea 2011; Marmadoro 2013), nor are they 
understood as being reducible to any competing material definitions which might concern those parts 
(Robinson 2014; Jaworski 2016).5 
                                                     
1 cf. Putnam (1975) 
2 In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke (1690/1995) referred to this as the dependence of an entity‟s 
„nominal‟ essence upon its „real‟ essence. For an instance of this in the context of contemporary hylomorphism, see 
Oderberg (2011) 
3 This contemporary notion of „matter‟ is closest to what commentators have called „functional matter‟ in Aristotle – 
see Lewis (1994). Notably, this contemporary formulation doesn‟t place any particular emphasis, as Aristotle did, on 
matter‟s definition as pure potentiality and its subsequent role in underlying accidental property-change.  
4 Note that this won‟t involve any careful exegesis of Aristotle – the reader is free to think of these aspects of a 
formal definition as neo-Aristotelian. 
5 The exception to this rule is Koslicki (2008), who views formal definitions as picking-out some further “non-
material”, though mereological, part of an entity. However, as this isn‟t widely held, and as Aristotle himself 
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 Secondly, a formal definition of an entity‟s nature picks-out some irreducibly higher-order fact 
about that entity and its constituents precisely because to define that nature qua form is to represent the 
entity as an ontological unity – as metaphysically one. In contrast to a material definition, wherein appeal is 
made to a collection of various discrete mereological parts and pieces, a formal definition‟s explanatory 
prowess is grounded in a holistic conception of an entity (Johnston 2006; Oderberg 2007; Rea 2011; 
Marmadoro 2013). The unity that formal definitions are meant to appeal to is understood as being 
importantly distinct from the “mere togetherness” that characterises the content of a material definition: 
to be sure, the latter cites an organised, connected collection of parts, but the former cites that collection as 
one. 
 The last aspect of this type of definition makes clear what this distinction really amounts to, as 
defining an entity‟s nature qua form involves an appeal to an entity as a causally unified system. This is 
typically cashed-out by the claim that a formal definition picks-out a higher-order causal activity of the entity 
as a whole (Jaworski 2012), or else one that is in some sense an emergent, irreducibly cooperative activity of an 
entity‟s constituents (Rea 2011). The causal unity implicit in a formal definition doesn‟t consist simply in 
the fact that a particular entity performs a particular higher-order activity which involves each of its parts 
operating in causal unison, but also that this structure orients these parts, as a whole, toward a particular 
causally privileged end, or ends. As one might expect of an Aristotelian account, to define the nature of 
entity qua form is to cite as explanatory (in the relevant sense) its holistic causal “directedness” toward 
some end-state(s) (Oderberg 2007; Rea 2011; Jaworksi 2012; Marmadoro 2013). In some sense then, a 
formal definition represents the entity‟s constituents as non-autonomous participants in a singularly 
directed, dynamically continuous structure.6 Thus we see again, now more clearly, the higher-order unity that 
a formal definition is meant to capture – namely, a holistic, goal-directed activity, ontologically 
attributable to an entity only as a singular causal system (Jaworski 2016). 
 As I understand it then, to define the nature of an entity qua form is to demarcate its holistically 
higher-order, dynamically directed causal structure as uniquely explanatory with respect to its possession 
of a set of typical features. Now that we‟ve a better grip on what a formal definition amounts to, the 
pertinent question is, given this conception, what‟s required in order to give a plausible defence of 
hylomorphism? For our purposes, as the more contested aspect of the doctrine, let us ask: what‟s 
required in order to give a plausible defence of the applicability of a formal definition of an entity‟s nature? 
To answer that question requires getting clearer about the nature of the defence I want to offer. As I‟ve 
said, my aim is to display and defend an empirical incarnation of the conceptual framework of 
hylomorphism. Thus, in explicating that framework, I have focused on the doctrine‟s core definitional 
claims, rather than any of its purported ontological commitments. As it happens, precisely what those 
commitments are is widely disputed, even among its adherents. If an entity‟s nature admits of a formal 
definition does this entail, for instance, that we must reformulate our account of mereological 
composition (Fine 1999; Johnston 2006; Koslicki 2008), or that we must countenance a novel ontological 
category whose members are imbued with unique, “downwardly directed” causal powers (Oderberg 2007; 
Rea 2011; Jaworksi 2012)? Or does such an admission merely require helping ourselves to a non-
ontological free lunch, delivered simply via a process of abstraction (Marmadoro 2013)? 
 Rather than taking a particular stance on this issue, my aim is to focus on the widely-accepted 
definitional project: after all, every defender of hylomorphism presumably agrees that the doctrine is 
committed to the claim that fully capturing the nature an entity requires an appeal the dichotomous 
descriptive machinery of matter and form, irrespective of whatever the ontological underpinnings or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
expressly argued against this type of position (see Metaphysics VII, 17 and VII, 3-6), I haven‟t considered her view in 
any detail here. 
6 Marmadoro (2013) refers to this phenomenon as the “re-identification” of an entity‟s constituents with respect to 
the function of its „substantial form‟. 
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consequences of those descriptions are taken to be. With the account laid out above then, the project of 
this paper is to show one way in which this definitional project may be vindicated; such vindication might 
be taken to entail particular ontological consequences for the doctrine, and although I won‟t be defending 
them in detail here, I will briefly address them in the final section. As already mentioned, to do so, the 
paper will focus on the clearly more contested aspect of the doctrine – formal definition. For my defence 
to have succeeded, it will have to have shown that the concepts invoked in this type of definition have a 
plausible empirical instance. Importantly, with the above discussion in mind, the success of this defence 
requires (a) showing that form is conceptually independent of matter, and (b) showing that form plays a unique 
explanatory role with respect to matter: (a) is satisfied if a formal definition of an entity, as explicated above, 
can be made without explicit appeal to its material definition, while (b) is satisfied if such a definition is 
able to play an explanatory role with respect to the possession of a characteristic set of an entity‟s features 
which is uncapturable by appealing to its material definition.7 
 My claim is that if we focus on the biological realm, itself once the fount of Aristotelian 
inspiration, a contemporary defence of the principles of hylomorphism is available: recent advances in 
developmental systems biology have shown, or so I will argue, that fully capturing the nature of biological 
entities is a job which requires both matter and form.  
 
Back to Biology: Building an Organism 
Aristotle‟s argument that the principles of his hylomorphic metaphysic were truly in rei was primarily 
grounded in the physical principles he believed to be in natura – that is, in the biological realm. If you‟re 
after a robust understanding of that metaphysic then, you‟d be better off examining starfish, rather than 
statues.8 Accordingly, most philosophers who‟ve since taken up the hylomorphic mantle have placed 
biological entities as paradigms of that metaphysic – and rightly so. However, although few deny that the 
doctrine naturally dwells in the “land of the living”, even fewer have taken on the project of providing a 
detailed account of how, and in what way, that realm is to be characterised by its metaphysical principles. 
Typically, at best, these philosophers merely suggestively cite practicing biologists‟ rather vague 
delineations of characteristic phenomena of life – homeostasis, emergence, etc. – as empirical undergirding 
for the doctrine‟s metaphysics (as in Jaworski 2012). More commonly however is the simple, though 
unexamined posit of biological entities as hylomorphic exemplars – one often finds „humanity‟ atop the 
candidates for form, for instance (as in Rea 2011).9 In what follows, I want to offer a more empirically 
specific focus, by examining in detail the particularities of an important class of biological entities. 
 Rather than taking on the “big picture” task of providing a hylomorphic account of the nature of 
biological entities tout court, I want to take up the more minute, and more manageable task of providing a 
hylomorphic account of the nature of the biological individuals which make-up biological entities. Why? 
One reason is practical: on my view, providing an empirically robust hylomorphic account of the nature 
of a biological entity – a starfish, for instance – is a complex and complicated affair requiring a perhaps 
unappreciated amount of philosophical subtlety. Better then, for the purposes of this paper, to make an 
attempt at the more practical task of providing such an account for the individuals which compose 
biological entities; ideally, the account I offer will be generalisable, “upwards” as it were, though I won‟t 
                                                     
7 The requirement that form provides novel explanatory power with respect to an entity‟s constituents, rather than a 
causal power over them, is explicitly defended by Rea (2011) and Jaworski (2012).  
8 The choice of creature here was no accident – Aristotle was quite interested in sea-creatures (in History of Animals), 
and sea urchin mouths are now known as „Aristotle‟s Lanterns‟ 
9 None of this is meant to suggest that these philosophers haven‟t dressed the doctrine with interesting and 
elucidating metaphysical flourishes – they certainly have. The point is simply that their doing so is often largely 
independent of any examination of the finer biological details. A notable exemption is Walsh (2006), and to a lesser 
extent, Boulter (2012). 
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be arguing for that here.10 Another reason is principled: the focus of my examination may not be best 
conceptualised as full-fledged entities in their own right, but they are most certainly biological individuals; 
more on this in a moment. And being biological individuals, it‟s reasonable to expect that a hylomorphic 
account ought to apply to them just as equally as it does to the larger individuals they compose. 
 That said, the individuals I want to focus on are called developmental modules, currently on the 
centre stage of research in the field of developmental systems biology. Developmental modules are 
discrete biological systems causally responsible for the development of particular morphological features. 
A foundational fact upon which the edifice of systems biology is built is that the morphological 
development of organisms is a rather piecemeal affair. More specifically, that an organism‟s development 
is controlled discretely, by individualised organismal sub-systems which initiate and direct the formation of 
its various body parts – eyes, legs, and the like. These sub-systems – or, developmental modules – are 
treated as individuals in part due to their relative causal autonomy during the process of development: 
they are characterised equally by an extremely high causal connectivity among their constituents and an 
extremely low causal connectivity with other parts of the organism (Raff & Sly 2000; Erwin & Davidson  
2009). They are, in other words, discernible bundles of tightly-knit causal loops whose activities are 
responsible for an organism‟s development of a particular trait. But developmental modules are also 
individuals in perhaps a stronger sense, as recent advances in evolutionary developmental biology (evo-
devo) have made clear: they are able to be generationally inherited, and so are traceable (with 
modification) throughout evolutionary history (Hall 2003; Davidson & Erwin 2006; Wagner 2014), a fact 
which may even merit them a place at the ground-floor of the elusive, proper “level of selection” 
(Brigandt 2007; Brakefield 2011; McCune & Schimenti 2012).11 In a perfectly respectable sense then, 
developmental modules, the organismal sub-systems causally responsible for the production of particular 
morphological traits, are biological individuals – and ontologically important ones at that, as it is their 
activities which give shape to the fully-featured biological entities we‟re more directly acquainted with. 
 The pertinent question then is: what is the nature of a developmental module? Recall that citing 
the nature of a thing is meant to provide rich explanatory import with respect to its characteristic 
feature(s). To answer that question then, we must know which feature(s) the citation of the nature of a 
module might purport to aid in explaining. The obvious answer seems to be that citing the nature of a 
module should help shed explanatory light upon the development of its associated morphological trait: it should, as 
I earlier put it, importantly aid in explaining the why and how of that process. Thus, providing an answer as 
to the nature of a developmental module requires some knowledge of what that process amounts to. If we 
consider that a fully developed morphological feature is nothing more than a particularised spatial 
configuration of various cell-types, we can get a preliminary grip on the process in question – put simply, 
it involves putting the correct things in the correct places. The process of “building” a morphological 
feature is thus two-fold: it requires the creation of a certain set of cell-types particular to the feature in 
question, and the arrangement of this set in a particular three-dimensional configuration. More 
specifically, the operation of that process involves not only that the genomes of a set of cells take on 
particular expression profiles which determine their individual developmental fates, but also that these 
specifically expressed cells are spatially coordinated in a particular configuration. 
 We now know that the process which begins with a collection of cells whose genomes are not in 
any particular expression state (i.e. pluripotent cells), known as an imaginal disc, which over time take on 
specific expression profiles in a coordinated fashion, requires the activity of an entire network of genes 
(Gurdon & Bourillot 2001; Tabata 2001; Mann & Carroll 2002). It requires a certain set of genes that act 
                                                     
10 Aristotle argues (in Ethics I, 7) that if the parts of a thing (a human eye, for instance) are understood as teleological 
– that is, having a form – so too must the whole thing (the human as an entire organism, in this case). 
11 The case is even stronger if one thinks, as Clarke (2013) suggests, that any bits of our biological ontology upon 
which natural selection operates have the right to be called biological individuals. 
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intra-cellularly to produce the proteins that determine the particular cell-types which “build” the 
morphological feature in question and a set of genes whose protein products (known as transcription factors) 
act inter-cellularly to regulate the intra-cellular expression profiles of other genes in neighbouring cells, 
thereby controlling which genes are expressed in which cells throughout the disc, as well as when and where 
that expression takes place during the development of a morphological feature. Thus we can model the 
process of the development of an imaginal disc by mapping out a genetic regulatory network (GRN) which 
includes the set of genes whose expression determines particular cell-types, the set of genes which control 
their expression, and the particularities of the causal, regulatory relationships among them (activation, 
repression, etc.) 
 Understood in this way, the development of a particular morphological feature can be seen as the 
temporal succession of a series of expression profiles of the GRN elements in the cells which compose an 
imaginal disc. Importantly, this is a process governed by the “regulatory logic” of that GRN, as the 
expression profile of each cell within the disc evolves over time according to the particularities of its 
regulatory structure: if G1 is highly expressed at t because it is up-regulated by G2 at t-1, then at t+1, G3 and 
G4 will be barely expressed, due to G1 highly down-regulating both, etc.12 Over time then, due to the 
specific regulatory logic of a particular GRN, the cells of an imaginal disc take on a controlled and 
continuous series of expression profiles via a series of patterning processes (Salazar-Ciudad et al. 2003) 
ultimately resulting in the collectively stable state of a various collection of particular cell-types arranged in 
a particular spatial configuration – that is, in a fully developed morphological feature. 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic two-dimensional representation of the early developmental stages of a multi-cellular imaginal disc constituting a 
module: ‘A/P’ denotes the anterior and posterior regions of the module, distinct bubble colours represent distinct cell-types, and arrows 
represent the causal/regulatory influence of one cell-type upon neighbouring cell-types. Over time, the cellular constitution of a module 
becomes increasingly compartmentalised and spatially discrete.  
 
It should by now be clear that if we wish to “capture the nature” of a developmental module, we must 
have recourse to its associated GRN, as knowledge of its elements and the relations among them sheds 
explanatory light upon the development of its associated morphological trait: if we want to explain the 
why and how of that process, we must appeal to the structural-causal mapping of its GRN. In doing so, we 
are citing its organised, connected collection of discrete parts as explanatory with respect to the 
possession of its characteristic feature. We are, in other words, showing the validity of defining the nature 
of a developmental module qua matter. But does such a definition fully capture the nature of a 
developmental module? That is, is there something yet left to account for with respect to offering the 
relevant explanatory utility which this definition fails to deliver? The answer, I think, is yes for, as I argue 
below, the material definition of a developmental module leaves one uninformed about its nature in an 
important respect.  
 
                                                     
12 For more on the regulatory “logic” found in GRNs, see Yeger-Lotem et al. (2004), and Alon (2007). 
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Modules & Morphospaces 
Although I have been preliminarily modelling the causal output of a developmental module rather rigidly 
as a singular, fully specified morphological feature, a complication must now be made, as the full picture 
admits of rather more flexibility. For we now know that the morphological structure produced by a single 
developmental module, being underwritten by a specific genetic regulatory network, is capable of a wide 
variety of intra- and inter-cellular environmentally induced phenotypic variation - this is the phenomenon 
of phenotypic plasticity, attested to by the reality (read: quantifiability) of reaction norms (Pigliucci 2001; West-
Eberhard 2003; Gilbert & Epel 2015). As a result of “upstream” alterations consisting mainly of 
heterochronical and heteropical changes in inter-cellular signalling, a single developmental module is 
capable of producing a wide range of “downstream” qualitative alterations in its associated morphological 
feature with respect to its precise shape, size, pigmentation, etc. (Schlichting & Smith 2002; Aubin-Horth 
& Renn 2009). Thus, the morphological feature generatively specified by a single developmental module 
cannot be fully characterised by a single, particularised instance with respect to these qualitative and 
quantitative factors, but must instead be understood as a generalised collection of various qualitative and 
quantitative variations on that feature – this set of possible permutations is known as the feature‟s 
morphospace. For this reason, capturing the generative capacity of a single developmental module with 
respect to its associated morphological feature must involve modelling its “variational tendencies”13, or its 
set of “developmental trajectories, [correlated with] the particular set of environmental conditions to 
which [it] is exposed”14, to construct an “idealised type…constructed from ample and acknowledged 
variation”15. 
With this in mind, it‟s clear that “fully capturing the nature of a developmental module” must 
involve capturing its rich generative capacity to produce its entire morphospace. The pertinent question for 
our purposes is: can the material definition we‟ve provided accomplish this? In order to answer this, we 
must look again to the causal story of development. We‟ve already seen that one can model a fully 
developed morphological feature as a specific spatial arrangement of a collection of cells with specific 
genetic expression profiles. We‟ve also seen that the developmental process involved in generating such a 
feature can be modelled as the temporal succession of states of the overall expression profile of the 
imaginal disc (itself composed of a number of individual cells‟ profiles), the transitions of which are 
governed by the regulatory logic specified by its GRN. Of course, we have thus far only modelled a single 
developmental trajectory towards the generation of a single variant of a morphological feature, and the 
phenomenon of developmental plasticity shows that many such trajectories are possible.   
However, accommodating this involves no further complication - using the same GRN and its 
constitutive regulatory logic, we can model each of these trajectories as the developmental consequence 
of its “generative rules” being applied in the context of distinct initial developmental input conditions 
(Gurdon & Bourillot 2001; Tabata 2001; Mann & Carroll 2002; Müller 2008). In other words, the 
phenomenon of developmental plasticity reflects the fact that a single regulatory network is capable of 
delivering a variety of distinct morphological end-states according to a variety of distinct initial 
developmental conditions, as altering the initial network-state of a module has regulatory consequences 
(specified by the generative rules of that network) on the expression states of its cells which ripple 
“downwards” and “outwards” throughout an imaginal disc during the process of development.  
 So, modelling a module‟s flexibility with respect to its capacity to produce various developmental 
trajectories by defining it materially – that is, via its associated GRN – is easily done. However, a further 
complication arises when one considers that the morphospaces associated with developmental modules 
                                                     
13 Van Dassow & Munro (1999: 316) 
14 Pigliucci et al. (1996: 81) 
15 Love (2009: 57) 
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are not merely reflections of their developmental plasticity, but also of their generative constraints: for these 
systems are not wholly flexible, causally subject to every incoming environmental influence during the 
process of development, but instead reliably and repeatedly end that process within a well-demarcated 
range of particular states (Rasskin-Gutman 2005; Newman and Müller 2006; McGhee 2006; Wagner 
2014). In other words, no module‟s morphospace consists of an ontologically exhaustive set of every 
possible qualitative and quantitative permutation on its associated morphological feature. Rather, the 
morphospace which characterises a developmental module is composed of a select set of generatively 
privileged permutations which arise within a wide-range of distinct environmental (read: causal) contexts. In 
this way, the character of a morphospace associated with a developmental module shows that nature 
delights in variety without indulging in it – morphological variation is allowed, but only within certain 
limits.  
 If “fully capturing the nature of a developmental module” involves capturing its rich generative 
capacity to produce its entire morphospace, then any adequate definition of that nature must be 
explanatorily relevant with respect not only to its generation of a certain amount of morphological 
variation, but also with respect to the specified constraints on that variation. What we require, in other 
words, is not only explanatory power with respect to a module‟s capacity to produce various distinct 
developmental trajectories, but also with respect to the limitations on that capacity. Importantly, note that 
understanding the latter allows us to understand, for any particular module, why these morphologies are 
privileged, and why they are so – something that cannot be achieved by simply appealing to any single 
developmental trajectory, nor to the entire set of privileged trajectories. Capturing this fact, I suggest, is 
crucial to capturing the nature of a developmental module. 
 Accomplishing this, as I will show, requires conceptualising these organismal sub-systems in a 
radically novel fashion, via the conceptual framework of dynamic systems theory (DST). Indeed, in doing so it 
requires, as I argue below, that we conceptualise developmental modules holistically, as higher-order, 
dynamically directed systems. 
 
Dynamic Systems Theory: A Formal Science 
The desire to more fully understand the developmental constraints of organismal systems was perhaps the 
founding motivation for the development of DST, a project begun in spirit by Waddington‟s (1957) posit 
of an „epigenetic landscape‟, and subsequently fleshed-out with insights from Kaufmann‟s (1969) Boolean 
modelling of GRNs (Wang et al. 2011; Huang 2012). DST, as a novel modelling technique of such 
systems, has afforded researchers a set of unique conceptual resources with which to understand the 
process of development, and is now rather widely applied in analyses of everything from sub-organismal 
cell-fate (Bhattacharya et al. 2011; Verd et al. 2014) to the evolvability of organism populations (Striedter 
1998; Jaeger & Monk 2014).16 
In order to show the utility of DST in this respect, and in application to our current project, let 
us take stock. We have seen that the developmental process involved in a module‟s generation of a 
morphological feature can be modelled as the temporal succession of states of the overall expression 
profile of the imaginal disc (itself composed of a number of individual cells‟ profiles), the transitions of 
which are governed by the regulatory logic specified by its GRN. This fact forms the foundation of DST 
modelling, and the thought is: if we construct an abstract multi-dimensional state-space whose individual 
points represent particular disc-wide expression profiles (where each specifies the expression-state of each 
GRN element within each cell in the disc), arranged continuously (according to cellular expression values) 
on axes which represent a particular cell-type in a particular spatial region, we can model a particular 
                                                     
16 There are now a number of specialist journals which focus on holistic treatments of developmental phenomena – 
see, for instance, Molecular Systems Biology and BMC Systems Biology. 
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instance of the development of a morphological feature as a temporal trajectory through this state-space, 
ending in the expression-state representing that feature; the figure below illustrates this type of model 




Figure 2: Schematic representation of a single developmental trajectory of a module through a (truncated) abstract state-space, in 
reference to fig. 1. On either side, the ‘module at t’ and ‘module at t+2’ depict the spatial arrangement of two cell types (β and ε) 
within the imaginal disc with respect its anterior (A) and posterior (P) regions. Each cell type is represented as consisting of the 
module’s GRN elements (depicted as elliptical bases), their regulatory connections (depicted by arrows), and their particular expression 
levels (depicted as stacked elliptical elements). In the middle of the figure, the temporal transition of the spatial arrangement of β and ε 
with respect to P is modelled as a trajectory through a two-dimensional plane whose edges represent unique disc-wide cellular GRN-
expression states, arranged such that the distance between any two edges reflects quantitative similarity with respect to spatially-specific 




Accordingly, utilising the data derived from experimental evidence of the phenomenon of phenotypic 
plasticity, we can represent the generative progression of a variety of the module‟s possible developmental 
routes by tracing-out distinct trajectories through a single multi-dimensional state-space. The resulting 
picture provides a representation of the multiple developmental pathways, each defined by distinct 
trajectories through GRN expression-value space, which are responsible for the production of the various 
morphological permutations which comprise the morphospace of a particular module. 
  As theoretically interesting as this model may be, it yet fails to offer us a comprehensive 
understanding of the structural limitations on a module‟s capacity to produce these permutations. In 
other words, as I earlier put it, this representative framework doesn‟t offer any elucidation with respect to 
why these permutations are privileged, or why they are so. I think it‟s clear that examining more closely any 
single trajectory corresponding to such a permutation isn‟t going to do the requisite work, but nor will a 
similar scrutiny of the entire set – in the end, we‟re still left in the dark as to what singles these trajectories 
out from among many possible ones, and thus, this collection of disc-wide GRN expression values from 
among many possible multi-cellular expression configurations. However, a natural way forward should 
suggest itself: if we want to see why these pathways are privileged, we ought to compare them to a set of 
less developmentally fortunate ones. 
                                                     
17 For a (relatively) accessible introduction to how this mapping is done, both theoretically and with the aid of 
empirical data, see Huang (2009) and Wang et al. (2011). 
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Given the representative machinery of our multi-dimensional state-space, we can do just that, as 
mapping out a trajectory on this space only requires our picking a state (a disc-wide cellular GRN 
expression profile) and iteratively applying the associated GRN regulatory logic to derive its temporally 
successive states. In other words, “determining the next move” of a developmental trajectory within state-
space from any state requires a simple conditionalising process: for any particular regulatory network, by 
plugging in a specific set of expression values for the members of that network, and applying the activities 
of the causal connectives which constitute its regulatory logic, we can derive its members subsequent 
expression values. Thus, because the regulatory logic of a GRN effectively acts to assign a Boolean 
function to each state within this state-space, we can vectorise any single state and trace the directionality 
of temporally successive states within that space (Wang et al. 2011; Davila-Velderrain et al. 2015). We can, 
in other words, plot any possible developmental trajectory for a particular imaginal disc.18 
If we do so, after a significant number of iterations, we find that the collection of these 
trajectories exhibit interesting properties. Firstly, we find that localised collections of trajectories follow 
similar curvatures through state-space: they appear to “stick together”, bending around similar regions of 
that space. Secondly, we find that multiple trajectories end in the same general areas in state-space: these 
regions appear to “attract” trajectories from various originating points within that space. As one may have 
guessed, these regions correspond to the disc-wide expression states that define the various 
morphological permutations which comprise the module‟s morphospace. 
 
                         
Figure 3: Schematic representation of a simplified, two dimensional state-space depicting a small selection of a module’s 
developmental trajectories. This truncated state-space represents the disc-wide cellular expression levels of the module with respect to two 
cell types (β and ε) in a particular spatial region (posterior, P). Multiple individual trajectories (depicted as arrows) from distinct 
initial conditions converge on a general region (φ) of developmental end-states with quantitatively similar spatially-specific disc-wide 
cellular expression values (with respect to ε and P). 
 
Notice that taking a “bigger picture” look at the characteristics of this state-space reveals precisely the 
features we were interested in, for here we see privileged permutations qua attractor-regions (e.g. φ in fig. 3) 
and constraints on possible permutations qua curvature structures on that space. What we want to know 
then is: what explains this shaping of state-space? We‟ve seen that the developmental transition from any 
particular point in state-space to the next is determined by a kind of Boolean function which utilises the 
                                                     
18 This is of course a rather complex task, given that performing it requires taking into account multiple cells, their 
spatial arrangement, and both intra- and inter-cellular regulatory interactions.  
This is a pre-print version of A Biologically Informed Hylomorphism, 
 to appear in Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science, Routledge (2017) 
11 
 
GRN‟s regulatory logic operating on the particular expression profile of the GRN elements which define 
that state. However, the transitions between states in this space is not reflective of merely simple 
analytical operations – for note that the transition-function in question is a regulatory one, and so each step 
within a single trajectory is a step toward disc-wide regulatory stability. In other words, although the state-
to-state transitions within that space take place according to the aforementioned Boolean model, each 
step throughout developmental time is in fact a transition from a less stable disc-wide expression profile to 
a more stable one, given the relevant regulatory structure. So, from any origination point within that space, 
the subsequent state-transitions which comprise its trajectory follow the multi-cellular expression profile 
of the disc‟s “search” for regulatory stability, where the relevant GRN elements‟ expressions “even-out” in 
such a way that their collected values no longer cause further significant inter-network expression 
alterations. 
 With this in mind, we can add another aspect to our state-space: each state can be given a stability 
measure which specifies the GRN elements‟ expression values tendency to substantially shift (given the 
relevant regulatory logic) to a subsequent state (Kim & Wang 2007; Bhattacharya et al. 2011); in effect, in 
this process, we are properly vectorising the state-space, in that the arrows we earlier assigned to each 
state now have a direction and a kind of magnitude. In DST modelling, this aspect is represented by 
assigning each state a particular elevation value (along another dimension), where the higher the elevation 
value, the relatively higher level of expression instability of the state – i.e. the more likely the disc-wide 
expression values of its GRN elements will shift (again, given the relevant regulatory relations in 
operation).19 Once we have done so, our abstract state-space is now a structured topology complete with 
high hills and low-lying basins with various gradient measures connecting them. 
 
                
 
Figure 4: Schematic topological representation of the state-space from fig. 3. The third dimension (U) reflects the elevation level of 
any particular disc-wide spatially-specific expression profile for any specific coordinate, itself a measure of the relative regulatory 
stability; here, a higher U-value and warmer colouration are inversely correlated with regulatory stability. φ, denoting a set of 
quantitatively similar developmental end-states with respect to ε-type expression profiles within the posterior compartment of a module 
(P), is shown as a low-lying basin within state-space. NB. although representing a complete such topology for a particular module 
would require a rather complex, multi-dimensional state-space, the same principles at play in this schematic would apply. 
 
With this stability-based topological mapping of our state-space in hand, we can now understand the 
process of the development of a particular module in a novel fashion: if we depict the state of the module 
as a kind of frictionless orb, we can model the temporal succession of various distinct states of the 
module throughout the process of development as the dynamic trajectory of that orb through a pathway 
geometrically constrained by the topological ridges and valleys of the system‟s Boolean regulatory 
                                                     
19 Technically, assigning an elevation value involves stochastic simulation of groups of cells, etc. – but I pass over this 
complication here. See Bhattacharya et al. (2011) for the finer details. 
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configuration. This novel modelling puts us in the position to understand more clearly why, for the 
corresponding morphospace of a particular module, these morphological permutations are privileged, and 
why they are so: they represent disc-wide patterns of regulatory stability with respect to intra-module cellular 
expression states which “carve-out” wide, low-lying basins in the topology of state-space, and their 
privilege consists in the fact that the dynamics of the process of development is shaped and constrained 
by the geometric curvature of that topology (Kitano 2004; Huang 2009; Huneman 2010). In this way, the 
framework of DST affords us a more complete picture of the rich generative capacity of a developmental 
module - for it not only allows us to understand a module‟s ability to produce the varied morphological 
permutations which comprise its associated morphospace, but importantly also the causal-cum-structural 
“shape” of that capacity with respect to both the developmental privileging of and constraint on those 
permutations. Thus, by utilising the conceptual resources of DST we are able to more fully “capture the 
nature” of a developmental module, having been equipped with the explanatory resources necessary to 
account for the multi-faceted character of the developmental process of its associated morphological trait. 
 Importantly however, note that in order to have this rich understanding of the nature of a 
developmental module, we have had to abstract away from its compositional particularities and their 
mechanistic interactions in an appeal to a higher-order structure which is neither a compositional part of the 
module, nor strictly reducible to any such part (or set of such parts).20 Of course, this process of 
abstraction required an initial appeal to its compositional elements and their mechanistic arrangement in 
order to define a network and its associated regulatory logic, but the resulting topology from which we 
have drawn the aforementioned explanatory prowess (a) is itself constructed purely from a set of 
functionally defined, weighted Boolean connectives which (b) form a continuous mapping over an 
exhaustive set of various iterations on the values of those compositional elements and their causal 
connectives. In as much as functionally defined operators are unable to qualify as “proper parts” of a 
biological system, (a) entails that this topology cannot be strictly understood as a contributing to the 
constitution of a module. Furthermore, given that a highly abstract, functional mapping which plots the 
interrelation of every possible configuration of an entire system is incapable of being bijectively assigned 
to the set of elements which compose that system, (b) illustrates the irreducibility of a topology to such a 
set; here, you might say, „the possible‟ outstrips „the actual‟. 
 Note further that, in utilising the explanatory resources afforded by our topological 
understanding of a developmental module, we have had to conceptualise it as a higher-order, dynamically 
holistic system: these are resources granted to us only by modelling the system‟s causal activity as an 
iterative operation on a continuous, integrative mapping of its entire collection of possible system-wide 
state-values. Indeed, each point in the collection that comprises a complete state-space is intimately 
connected to its neighbouring points to form a smooth gradient contour so that the resulting geometry of 
that topology – and thus its dynamic “flow” – cannot be attributed to any particular GRN element, nor 
the entire GRN, but only to the system as a whole, by taking into account its exhaustive set of possible 
disc-wide expressions states (Jaeger & Monk 2015). For within that topology, each individual vector is 
merged into a holistic dynamic structure, and it is this integrated flow (and not the specification of any 
underlying operating mechanisms) which plays an explanatory role with respect to the multi-faceted 
developmental of the module‟s characteristic morphological feature via system-wide stability measures and 
their resulting topological curvature. 
 What‟s more, the flow which characterises this higher-order structure doesn‟t just represent the 
dynamic activity of the system acting as a whole (as “one”), but as a whole with respect to its directedness 
toward certain states: the flow of the system, characterised by its vector-summed stability measures, presents 
a topology whose geometrical configuration directs a module‟s process of development toward certain 
                                                     
20 See Levy & Bechtel (2013) for a good discussion of this general sort of abstraction process in biological modeling. 
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morphological end-states qua disc-wide expression patterns of regulatory stability.21 For the system‟s 
causal progression, represented as the temporal traversal of that process through the two-dimensional 
state-space of disc-wide expression profiles, is no random walk – it is guided by (and restricted by) the three-
dimensional contours of its holistically-defined topology toward certain developmentally privileged 
morphologies. Importantly, this “goal-directedness” which bestows explanatory utility with respect to 
morphological development is attributable only to that topology, and thus the to the system as a whole – as 
we have seen, the stability-measure which defines that topology cannot be gleaned from the mere 
specification of the module‟s GRN, or any single iteration of that GRN within a possible disc-wide 
expression state, or even any particular developmental trajectory guided by the regulatory strictures of that 
GRN. 
 
Hylomorphic Modules: Explanation & Ontology 
With all of the above in mind, the point I wish to make ought to be clear: in order to have a sufficiently 
rich understanding of the nature of a developmental module and its associated generative capacity, we 
have had to appeal to a holistic conception of its system-wide causal structure in which its various possible 
developmental trajectories toward particular morphological end-states are dynamically united.  
Importantly, although this higher-order causal structure to which we must appeal is in an intimate 
way metaphysically tied-up with the mereological make-up of a developmental module, as its 
constitutional elements specify the module‟s possible expression profile (which define its corresponding 
state-space) and the regulatory logic which governs the temporal transitions between them, the preceding 
discussion has strongly indicated that this abstracted causal structure is importantly conceptually independent 
of that make-up, in that each state which comprises its space is defined functionally (as a weighted Boolean 
function), and the resulting topological structure, qua functional mapping, is conceptually independent of 
the mechanistic particularities of the activities of the module‟s GRN elements. This is further evidenced 
by the fact that a wide variety of permutations in the mereological make-up of a module which are 
nonetheless causally connected by the same regulatory architecture will result in that system‟s higher-
order, topological structure being unchanged: thus, a particular geometrical-cum-dynamical mapping cannot be 
conceptually wed to any particular set of constitutional elements (Gilbert & Bolker 2001; Jaeger & Monk 
2015).22 Indeed, the now popular evo-devo project of individuating homologue-specifying developmental 
modules via processual definitions, itself grounded in the overwhelming evidence that distinct GRNs have 
underwritten the same developmental modules over time, depends upon this fact (Rieppel 2005; Brigandt 
2007; Love 2009; Wagner 2014).23 
 Furthermore, although this higher-order structure is conceptually distinguishable from the 
diverse array of its mereological underpinnings, it cannot for that reason be regarded as a mere heuristic 
artefact, as an appeal to its nature licences unique explanatory and predictive power with respect to the causal 
structure of the process of morphological development.24 As we have seen, understanding the process of 
the development of a particular morphological feature as a dynamic traversal through a topological 
                                                     
21 Interestingly, Von Dassow & Munro (1999: 310) briefly note in passing the conceptual similarity between the 
causal privileging of end-state morphologies in DST models and an Aristotelian form of “goal-directedness”. 
22 Thus, in accord with the classic Aristotelian picture, „form‟ will be multiply realisable – the “one over many” - in at 
least an explanatory sense. See Mitchell (2012) for a comprehensive look at the phenomenon‟s various incarnations 
in contemporary biology. 
23 For an account which more explicitly defines homologous morphological structures in the framework of DST, see 
Striedter (1998). 
24 Even if the explanatory virtues provided by higher-order, dynamic models must ultimately somehow “bottom 
out” in the activity of mechanisms (as Kaplan & Craver (2011) argue), it‟s not clear that this detracts from their 
having genuinely novel explanatory power (Bridgandt 2015); for an opposing view, see Kaplan (2015). I discuss 
these issues in Austin (2016b). 
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mapping of expression stability affords a novel, non-mechanistic explanation of the shape and structure of a 
module‟s developmental capacity: this is an explanatory oblation purchased by an appeal to a module as a 
higher-order, dynamically integrated system, rather than by its mere characterisation as a specific set of 
“entities and activities” (Huneman 2010). But this understanding also provides novel, non-mechanistic 
predictive power with respect to that process, for the particularities of the higher-order, pseudo-kinetic 
curvature of the system‟s stability topology licences inductive inferences regarding both the probability of 
the module following particular developmental trajectories (under certain conditions, and more generally) 
and the probability of the module producing particular morphological permutations (under certain 
conditions, and more generally). This prowess is exhibited perhaps most prominently in cutting-edge cell 
biology, where the regulation and re-programmability of cell fate is analysed via the higher-order 
topological dynamics of stem cells (Bhattacharya et al. 2011; Li & Wang 2013), but it is present (and 
increasingly so) in the study of everything from plant morphology (Álvarez-Buylla et al. 2008) to 
carcinogenesis (Kaneko 2011). 
Thus, in satisfaction of the twinned goal I earlier introduced, I have shown not only (a) that a 
higher-order, holistically dynamic, goal-directed structure can be conceptually distinguished from the 
particular vagaries of a developmental module‟s mereological underpinnings, but also (b) that by 
appealing to this structure, one is afforded a wealth of unique explanatory resources with respect to the 
generative capacity of that module and its associated morphospace. In other words, to return to our 
original formulation, I‟ve shown that fully “capturing the nature” of a developmental module requires not 
only having a grip on its specific constitutive collection of genetic elements and the particular 
arrangement of their causal connectives, but also on the dynamically directed topology of its higher-order 
causal structure. Or, to put it yet another way: it is a job which requires an appeal to both matter and 
form. 
 While providing a plausible, empirically informed vindication of the Lockean definitional project 
of hylomorphism in the biological realm – which has been the sole aim of this paper - is no trivial task, 
one might yet wonder what the metaphysical worth of this toil is: what does a successful defence of (a) 
and (b) tell us, for instance, about the ontology of organisms? In line with the purpose of this paper, as 
stated in §1, I have intentionally remained silent on this issue in the hope that the results of the discussion 
might be of applicable value to a wide variety of specific accounts (of the kind earlier mentioned), and not 
stand or fall on the posits of any particular ontology. And although for that reason I have refrained from 
giving those results any ontological gloss, I think it‟s instructive to end by briefly more explicitly noting 
the ways in which they aren‟t in any way inimical to, and in fact offer conceptual support to, the typical 
ontological claims of contemporary hylomorphism.   
 Note first that showing that (a) is true is a prerequisite for attempting to defend the truth of the 
central claim of hylomorphism – that fully capturing the nature of an entity requires an appeal to both 
matter and form: whatever your particular ontological commitments, if the nature of entities cannot be 
shown to be at the very least conceptually bipartite, that claim is clearly off the table. Of course, (a) being 
true only secures the conceptual independence of form from matter, and one might reasonably expect a 
project which aims to aid the cause of hylomorphic ontologies to do better: wouldn‟t showing that form 
is also existentially independent from matter be of more use? In this instance, the answer is no. For although 
hylomorphism conceptualises entities as ontological unities of form and matter, this is a unity which is not 
taken to be established by metaphysically tying together – either through “composition or connection” 
(Metaphysics VIII, 6) - two existentially separate sub-entities. And because hylomorphism denies the very 
possibility of the existence of uninformed matter, or immaterial form, a call for the truth of something more 
robust than (a) betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrine. 
 That said however, vindicating the conceptual independence of form aids in supporting the 
ontological claims of hylomorphism in only a limited fashion – namely, by securing a metaphysical 
foundation for them. Showing that (b) is true, on the other hand, may go some way further in that task. If 
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(b) is true, and the higher-order dynamic structure of developmental modules licenses irreducibly novel 
explanatory power with respect to the ontogenic processes of its mereological make-up then plausibly, 
given that explanation often traces causation, we may have prima facie reason for thinking that structure 
possesses irreducibly novel causal power. Importantly, while this sort of move is certainly defeasible, any 
proposed annulment of it on the grounds that “existential dependence entails causal ineffectuality” ought 
to be dismissed.25 Not only would this sort of objection beg the question against hylomorphism, but as its 
defenders have been at pains to point out (Rea 2011; Koons 2014; Jaworski 2016), the emergent properties 
of entities which are typically acknowledged to existentially depend upon their „realisation bases‟ are often 
assigned causal roles, and treated with ontological sincerity – a practice now widely adopted in 
contemporary developmental biology (Boogerd et al. 2005; Mitchell 2012; Salazar-Ciudad & Jernvall 2013; 
Pigliucci 2013). 
If the holistically higher-order dynamic structure of developmental modules can be understood as 
a causal structure then, in line with the „Eleatic Principle‟ (“to be is to be powerful”) – widely adopted among 
neo-Aristotelians in the defence of dispositional realism – we have good reason for thinking it represents 
a fact about the ontology of those modules.26 Indeed, the recent surge in support for adopting a 
Whiteheadean „process ontology‟ in the philosophy of biology can be seen as a reflection of the growing 
consensus that such mechanistically irreducible, higher-order causal structures must be understood as 
genuinely “carving at the joints” of organisms (Henning & Scarfe 2013; Dupré 2013; Jaeger & Monk 
2015).27 
Putting particular ontologies aside however, the more general lesson I wish to draw from the 
preceding discussion is that both (a) and (b) being true not only reflects the assumption in contemporary 
developmental biology that this formal structure is no mere metaphor, or philosophical phantasm, but also 
functions as the conceptual soil in which a neo-Aristotelian hylomorphic ontology might flourish. That 
said, though the further question as to whether and to what extent any of the ontologies currently on 
offer bear philosophical fruit is no doubt an important one, it is an enquiry I leave for another time. 
 
Summing Up 
Though the neo-Aristotelian congregation has grown considerably in recent years, most of its members 
have hesitantly refrained from adopting a doctrine historically central to its metaphysical catechism, and 
understandably so – for while many have demonstrated its theoretical plausibility, few have offered a 
compelling account of its empirical viability.  Throughout this paper, by focusing on the biological realm, 
and appealing to recent theoretical advances therein, I have attempted to do just that. To that end, I‟ve 
argued that the hylomorphic claim that fully “capturing the nature” of a biological individual requires an 
appeal both to it qua an organised, connected collection of discrete parts and qua a dynamically directed 
higher-order holistic structure can be given empirical content. In doing so, I‟ve focused on a particularly 
important class of biological sub-systems with the hope that, given their role as developmental building 
blocks, the account can eventually be generalised to a higher-level hylomorphic account of organisms.28 
                                                     
25 There are of course other, independent reasons one might have for rejecting that move – see Robinson (2014) for 
a recent critique. 
26 The principle originated in Plato‟s Sophist, and was reintroduced in to contemporary debates by Armstrong 
(1997). 
27 Waddington (1969) himself, the progenitor of the „epigenetic landscape‟ concept, professed to being deeply 
influenced by Whitehead, as Gilbert and Bolker (2001) note. More recently, Hall (2013) has characterised the 
contemporary topological models of DST as having a natural home within a Whiteheadean ontology. 
28 The conceptual resources utilized here may even be applicable to a hylomorphic account of biological „natural 
kinds‟, the first steps of which are undertaken in Austin (2016a). 
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While that crucial work yet lies ahead, the hope is that this paper has shown it a task worth its toil by 
making a compelling case that the hylomorphic creed is one worthy of contemporary conviction. 
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